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ABSTRACT 
 
We study post-acquisition performance of US public utilities that acquired other US exchange listed 
firms during 1996-2002.  We find that acquirer shareholders do not gain any abnormal returns from 
the acquisition over the two years following the acquisition and there are no unexpected gains in the 
underlying operating performance of the acquirers. We also find that while stock acquirers show a 
decrease in post-acquisition performance, their CEO salary increases relative to the industry. This 
suggests that method of payment may be an important factor in discerning the motivation for an 
acquisition. Lack of clarity regarding effects of a complex process like an acquisition, for 
shareholders and perhaps the even the management, combined with potential increase in prestige 
and salary for the management, may be the motivation for M&A activity in stock mergers. Cash 
acquirers may be more careful and consequently do not show subsequent underperformance.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
ignificant Merger and Acquisition (M&A) activity commenced for the utility industry following the Energy 
Policy Act of 1992. The restructurings are in response to deregulation efforts because of technological 
advancements such as efficient small-scale plants, and transmission systems that facilitate distribution over 
wider areas, reducing entry barriers and the need for local monopolies (Becker-Blease et al., 2004). Typical reasons 
why mergers would benefit consumers and shareholders are similar to those provided for M&A activity in other 
industries, such as potential increases in efficiency, economies of scale, diversification in the sources of power 
generation and geographic diversification leading to correction of regional imbalances.  
 
Results from prior research into whether mergers and acquisitions benefit acquirer shareholders, or the 
economy as a whole, have been sufficiently contradictory that surveys of the same literature reach different 
interpretations (Buchholtz, 1991)
1
. For M&A activity in general, acquirer shareholders lose in 65% of the cases 
around the time of the announcement (Sirower and O'Byrne, 1998). Whether this is because of market inefficiency 
and acquirer shareholders recoup the losses over the long term is unclear due to methodological biases in long-term 
studies. However research (e.g. Cakici, 2004) based on recent methodological prescriptions of Barber and Lyon, 
(1997), Lyon et al (1999) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) tends to support Fama's (1998) contention that the 
evidence against market inefficiency is weak and evidence of mispricing disappears  when methodological biases are 
removed. 
 
Utility mergers differ from those in unregulated industries in that there is greater regulatory oversight and it 
takes longer to accomplish the mergers. Additionally, there are restrictions on what benefits can be retained by the 
company and what must be passed on to the consumers (see for example Berry, 1998; Blecker-Blease et al., 2004). 
                                                          
1 For example Mueller (1980), Halpern (1983), Jensesn and Ruback (1983), Lubatkin (1983), Conn (1985), and Caves (1989). See 
also Hubbard and Palia (1999) and Agrawal and Jaffe (2000). 
S 
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However Blecker-Blease et al. (2004) find, in line with merger and acquisitions studies of unregulated industries, that 
mergers and acquisitions in the utility industry did not create economic value for the acquirer shareholders, or for the 
economy as a whole. 
 
Our study of the post-acquisition performance of US utilities that acquired other US exchanged listed firms 
during 1996-2002 also suggests that acquirer shareholders do not gain any abnormal returns from the acquisition over 
the two years following the acquisition and that stock acquirers showed a decrease in performance. There was no 
unexpected gain in the underlying operating performance of the company. We also find that the CEO salary increased 
relative to the industry for stock mergers. This suggests that method of payment may be an important factor in 
discerning the motivation for an acquisition. Lack of clarity regarding effects of a complex process like an acquisition, 
for shareholders and perhaps the even the management, combined with potential increase in prestige and salary for the 
management, may be the motivation for M&A activity in stock mergers. Cash acquirers may be more careful and 
consequently do not show subsequent underperformance. However, results from cash mergers should be interpreted 
with caution due to the small sample size. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the data and research methodology.  
Section 3 presents the results of our analyses.  Concluding remarks are provided in Section 4.  
 
DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODS  
 
 We consider completed acquisitions of U.S. firms listed on New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American 
Stock Exchange (AMEX) and National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ) 
by exchange listed U.S. public utility firms during 1996-2002.  The initial list of firms is obtained from the Mergers 
and Acquisitions database of Global Securities Information, Inc. (GSI).  A search in the database for completed 
acquisitions by of U.S. target firms by U.S. public utility firms returns 135 deals between 1996 and 2002.  Following 
the methodology of Mitchell and Stafford (2000), if an acquirer firm carries out multiple acquisitions within 3 years of 
the first acquisition, we ignore the subsequent acquisitions and exclude those deals from our sample to avoid cross 
sectional correlations. Eliminating multiple acquisitions by the same acquirer and deals involving acquirer firms that 
do not exist in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database leads to a final sample of 76 acquisitions 
completed by U.S. public utility firms during 1996-2002.  We obtain market-related data for firms from the daily 
CRSP database, and the accounting data from the quarterly Compustat database.  Executive compensation data is from 
the Compustat ExecuComp database, which includes compensation data for approximately 2,600 largest publicly 
traded firms. 
 
 Table 1 presents the sample description.  Our full sample has 48 stock mergers, 23 cash mergers and 5 mixed 
mergers, where payment method includes both stock and cash.  For the full sample, 29% of the acquisitions are 
realized in the year 2000.  All of the cash mergers occurred during 1999-2002, the second half of the sample period, 
and 52% of cash mergers are in 2000.  Stock mergers are distributed relatively more evenly over the sample period 
1996-2002.  The highest number of stock mergers occurred in 1997 and 1998, during which period there are no cash 
mergers in our sample.  73% of stock mergers and 56% cash mergers are focus increasing deals where targets and 
acquirers are in the same two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code.  Acquirer firms are either electric or 
gas utilities in both stock mergers and cash mergers with the exception of 3 water utilities in the sample of stock 
mergers.  Both stock and cash mergers have a similar distribution of around two-thirds electric utilities and one-third 
gas.  
 
Stock Performance 
 
 We investigate the abnormal post-acquisition share performance of utility acquirer firms based on precision 
weighted cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) with Patell Z tests adjusted for serial dependence (Patell, 
1976; Mikkelson and Patch, 1988), and buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) using skewness corrected t-statistics 
(Lyon et al., 1999).  We also used the generalized sign Z test for CAARs and BHARs, a nonparametric test controlling 
for the asymmetry of positive and negative abnormal returns during the estimation period (Cowan, 1992).  Our pre-
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acquisition period is the two years before the announcement of the acquisition, while the post-acquisition period is the 
two years after the completion of the acquisition.   
 
Table 1: Sample  
 
The full sample includes 76 mergers including 48 stock mergers, 23 cash mergers and 5 stock and cash mergers.  All mergers are 
completed during 1996-2002 and obtained from Mergers and Acquisitions database of Global Securities Information, Inc.  The 
distribution of mergers over the years, number of same industry and different industry mergers, merger transaction values in 2002 
dollars and change in pre- to post-acquisition percentage change in executive compensation are presented.  Targets with same 2-digit 
SIC refer to cases where the target and acquirer firms have the same two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes while 
Targets with different 2-digit SIC are those acquisitions where the target and acquirer firms do not have the same two-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification codes.  Consumer Price Index used in converting the transaction value to 2002 dollars is obtained from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
 
 
 Full Sample Stock Mergers Cash Mergers 
Distribution of Mergers 
1996 - 2002 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
 
76 
3 
10 
12 
6 
22 
10 
13 
 
48 
3 
10 
12 
4 
8 
6 
5 
 
23 
0 
0 
0 
2 
12 
2 
7 
Targets with same 2-digit SIC 
Targets with different 2-digit SIC 
Target SIC Unidentified 
49 
16 
11 
35 
7 
6 
13 
7 
3 
Acquirer Firms 
Electric Utilities 
Gas Utilities 
Water Utilities 
 
45 
28 
3 
 
29 
16 
3 
 
13 
10 
Target Firms 
Electric Utilities 
Gas Utilities 
Water Utilities 
Other Industry 
Unidentified 
 
22 
33 
6 
5 
10 
 
14 
23 
4 
1 
6 
 
7 
8 
2 
3 
3 
Transaction Value (Millions) 
Mean 
Median 
Minimum 
Maximum 
 
$1,367 
$308 
$3 
$8,629 
 
$1,594 
$307 
$6 
$8,269 
 
$823 
$280 
$26 
$4,578 
 
 
 
Abnormal stock return for a sample firm i on day t is the stock return of the firm i in excess of the benchmark 
return for that day, 
 
tbenchmarkitit RRA ,                       (1) 
 
The average abnormal return on day t is estimated as the sample mean for that day, and for a sample of N firms, 
N
A
AAR
N
i
it
t

 1                        (2) 
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The CAAR is then estimated over a period starting on day T1 relative to the event day and ending on day T2, 
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We follow Cowan (2003) to estimate the precision weighted CAARs using the relative weights implied by 
Patell Z statistics for the null hypothesis of no abnormal returns (Patell, 1976).  
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and s
2
 is the maximum likelihood variance estimate for Ait.   
 
Benchmark returns are obtained using the market model, 
 
itmtiiit RR                         (6) 
 
where Rit is the sample firm i's stock return on day t, Rmt is the rate of return on the market index on day t; and єjt is the 
corresponding homoscedastic error term with an expected value of zero and uncorrelated with other firms' stock 
returns and the market return.  Parameters i and i to generate the benchmark return are estimated over the 255 day 
estimation window ending 46 days before the acquisition announcement date, using ordinary least square estimates.  
 
BHARs are compounded daily returns in excess of benchmark returns estimated using the market model 
(Equation 6), over a period starting on day T1 relative to the event day and ending on day T2. For each sample firm, i,  
 
 
 
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Tt
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tbenchmarkiti RRBHAR                    (7) 
 
We use two different measures for the market index in estimation of the benchmark returns for both CAARs 
and BHARs: Dow Jones Utilities Index and CRSP size deciles indices. Size decile indices are created by ranking all 
CRSP stocks based on their market capitalizations.  Each firm in the sample is matched to a size decile index on the 
event date.  
 
 Besides abnormal returns we also examine whether there are any changes in the systematic risk and total 
equity risk for the sample acquirer firms during the two years after the acquisition, using the three-factor Fama-French 
(1993) regression following Boehme and Sorescu (2002).  We estimate the Fama-French regression for each acquirer 
firm, using daily returns for 2 years before the acquisition announcement and two years after the acquisition 
completion. 
 
                  ittitiftmtiiftit eHMLSMBRRRR                    (8) 
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where Rit and Rft are the daily returns for each firm and one-month Treasury bill, respectively, Rmt is the value-
weighted (VW) market return, SMBt is the difference between the VW returns on small firms and big firms, and HMLt 
is the difference between the VW returns on high book-to-market firms and low book-to-market firms.  Cross-
sectional averages of pre- to post-acquisition changes in the Fama-French factors are reflected in the risk coefficients 
of βiΔ, γiΔ and δiΔ.  Pre- to post-acquisition change in systematic risk is measure by βiΔ while change in equity 
risk,ΔK, is estimated using mean daily Fama-French factors over the sample period (Boehme and Sorescu, 2002). 
 
ΔK=(βiΔ*mean[Rmt-Rft])+(γiΔ*mean[SMBt])+(δiΔ*mean[HMLt])                 (9) 
 
Operating Performance 
 
 Barber and Lyon (1996) suggest using cash flow based performance measures rather than accounting measures 
such as return on book value of equity or assets, for studying abnormal operating performance following an event.  We 
use operating margin defined as operating cash flows divided by net sales as our primary measure.  Operating cash 
flows are defined as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.  We scale operating cash flows by 
net sales to facilitate comparisons across firms and time periods (Barber and Lyon, 1996; Healy et al., 1992, 1997).  
Using operating assets instead of net sales would have been more appropriate (Healy et al. 1997). However, we are 
unable to measure the true value of operating assets, and using proxies such as book value of debt plus market value of 
equity may lead to more biases compared to using net sales.  We also examine return on capital, book-to-market value 
of equity and debt-to-equity ratios.  Return on capital is net income divided by sum of total equity and debt.  Book-to-
Market is the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity, which is the product of stock price per share and 
number of stocks outstanding.  Debt-to-Equity is the ratio of book value of total debt to book value of total equity.  
Results are presented for the full sample of utility mergers as well as stock and cash mergers.  All variables are adjusted 
for industry and estimated using quarterly Compustat data.  Following Barber and Lyon (1996), median values along 
with Wilcoxon rank sum tests are examined to detect any pre- to post-acquisition change in the industry adjusted 
variables.  
 
 We form industry benchmarks using the S&P Super Composite 1500 Index, which is a broad market index 
representing 90% of the U.S. equities and includes the S&P 500, the S&P Mid cap 400 and the S&P Small cap 600 
Indices.  Each sample acquirer firm is assigned to a business sector that includes all companies in the S&P Super 
Composite 1500 Index with the same SIC code as the sample firm.  Industry adjusted variables for each sample firm 
are the acquirer firm's values in excess of its corresponding business sector mean values.     
 
 We estimate the average pre- to post-acquisition change in a variable for each firm as the difference between 
the industry adjusted median value over the eight-quarter (i.e., two year) post-acquisition period and that over the 
eight-quarter pre-acquisition period.
2
  We are unable to extend the post-acquisition period beyond two years due to the 
lack of data as the sample period ends in 2002. 
 
Executive Compensation 
 
 We examine the mean and median changes in CEO (Chief Executive Officer) annual cash compensation and 
total annual compensation for the full sample and the samples of stock mergers and cash mergers.  There are 30 stock 
mergers and 15 cash mergers which have executive compensation data.  The full sample has 47 transactions with 
available data, two of which are transactions with mixed stock and cash payment.  Cash compensation includes total 
salary and bonus payments.  Total compensation includes salary, bonus, other annual, total value of restricted stocks 
granted, total value of stock options granted (estimated using Black-Scholes), long-term incentive payouts and all 
other payments made in a year.   
 
 We first compute the average compensation during the two year before the announcement and that during the 
two year after the acquisition completion.  One year data is missing for five firms in stock mergers and two firms in 
                                                          
2 We ignore the quarter period that includes the acquisition announcement or completion month to avoid problems due to the 
difference in timing following Healy et al. (1997), who also compare post-acquisition operating performance to pre-acquisition 
performance.   
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cash mergers.  For these firms we use one year data instead of the average of two years.  For each sample firm, we 
also estimate mean and median CEO compensation levels for the industry, where we define industry as the 
ExecuComp universe of utility firms with SIC codes 4900-4949.   
 
 We obtain industry adjusted values for each sample firm, by dividing the compensation paid by the firm by 
the industry median for the corresponding period. Percentage changes from pre- to post-acquisition periods are 
reported for full sample, stock mergers and cash mergers.  We use t-tests for significance of means and Wilcoxon 
signed rank tests for significance of medians.   
 
RESULTS  
 
 Table 2 presents abnormal stock performance results for utility acquirer firms.  Panels A.1 and A.2 show 
CAAR and BHAR results for full sample. Corresponding results for stock mergers are in Panels B.1 and B.2, and for 
cash mergers in Panels C.1 and C.2.   
 
 Full sample results during the event window, starting one day before the announcement to one day after the 
completion are almost all insignificant, except that cash mergers show some positive CAAR relative to CRSP size 
deciles. 
 
 
Table 2:  Abnormal Stock Returns For Utility Mergers During 1996-2002 
 
Abnormal stock performance for utility acquirers is presented. Panel A shows the results for the full sample 
while Panels B and C present the results for stock mergers and cash mergers, respectively.  Section 1 of each panel 
shows cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) which are estimated over a period starting on day T1 relative to 
the event day and ending on day T2.  
 

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Abnormal return for each sample firm on a day t is the firm's stock return in excess of its benchmark return 
on the same day.  Precision weighted CAAR, a standardized mean CAAR (Cowan, 2003), is reported.  
 
Section 2 of each panel shows the results for buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs) as compounded daily 
returns in excess of benchmark returns over the estimation window. 
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The benchmark returns for both panels are obtained using the market model.  The market index has 2 
different measures: Dow Jones Utilities Index and CRSP Sice Decile Indices.  Size decile Indices are created by 
ranking all CRSP stocks based on their market capitalizations.  Each stock in the sample is matched to a size decile 
index on the event date.  
 
N is number of events with available data.  Z is the statistics for the Patell Z test (Patell, 1976), and is 
adjusted for serial dependence (Mikkelson and Patch, 1988).  Skewness-corrected T-test is the normal test adjusted for 
skewness (Hall, 1992).  Generalized sign Z test is a nonparametric test controlling for the asymmetry of positive and 
negative abnormal returns during the estimation period (Cowan, 1992).  The symbols $,*,**, and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively. 
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Panel A.1 Full Sample: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (Caar)  
Days N CAAR Positive: Negative Z Generalized Sign Z 
Section 1. Benchmark: Market Model, Dow Jones Utilities Index 
(-504,-2) 74 -0.40% 33:41 -0.134 -0.646 
(-1,+1) 74 1.27% 36:38 -0.364 0.052 
(+2,+504) 73 -9.00% 34:39 -2.686** -0.200 
Section 2. Benchmark: Market Model, CRSP Size Deciles Indices 
(-504,-2) 74 4.30% 37:37 1.239 0.270 
(-1,+1) 74 7.18% 41:33 0.947 1.200 
(+2,+504) 73 -4.74% 31:42 -1.264 -0.993 
 
 
Panel A.2 Full Sample: Mean Buy And Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR)  
Days N BHAR Positive: Negative Skewness-corrected T-stat. Generalized Sign Z 
Section 1. Benchmark: Market Model, Dow Jones Utilities Index 
(-504,-2) 74 -71.97% 30:44 -2.129* -1.344 
(-1,+1) 74 -1.40% 35:39 -0.453 -0.181 
(+2,+504) 73 -93.47% 32:41 -3.203** -0.669 
Section 2. Benchmark: Market Model, CRSP Size Deciles Indices 
(-504,-2) 74 38.20% 35:39 -2.147* -0.196 
(-1,+1) 74 0.42% 38:36 0.142 0.502 
(+2,+504) 73 -57.13% 29:44 -2.842** -1.461 
 
 
Panel B.1 Stock Mergers: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (Caar)  
Days N CAAR Positive: Negative Z Generalized Sign Z 
Section 1. Benchmark: Market Model, Dow Jones Utilities Index 
(-504,-2) 48 0.89% 26:22 0.229 0.923 
(-1,+1) 48 -1.36% 22:26 -0.818 -0.299 
(+2,+504) 48 -9.67% 17:31 -2.667** -1.744$ 
Section 2. Benchmark: Market Model, CRSP Size Deciles Indices 
(-504,-2) 48 1.70% 25:23 0.396 0.586 
(-1,+1) 48 3.28% 24:24 -0.075 0.281 
(+2,+504) 48 -5.18% 20:28 -1.262 -0.875 
 
 
Panel B.2 Stock Mergers: Mean Buy And Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR)  
Days N BHAR Positive: Negative Skewness-corrected T-stat. Generalized Sign Z 
Section 1. Benchmark: Market Model, Dow Jones Utilities Index 
(-504,-2) 48 -86.19% 23:25 -1.603 0.056 
(-1,+1) 48 -3.08% 22:26 -0.798 -0.299 
(+2,+504) 48 -52.32% 16:32 -2.963** -2.033* 
Section 2. Benchmark: Market Model, CRSP Size Deciles Indices 
(-504,-2) 48 -46.16% 21:27 -1.867$ -0.570 
(-1,+1) 48 -2.52% 22:26 -0.700 -0.297 
(+2,+504) 48 -38.18% 19:29 -2.790** -1.164 
 
 
Panel C.1 Cash Mergers: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (Caar) 
Days N CAAR Positive: Negative Z Generalized Sign Z 
Section 1. Benchmark: Market Model, Dow Jones Utilities Index 
(-504,-2) 22 -0.42% 11:11 -0.540 0.480 
(-1,+1) 22 26.26% 12:10 0.754 0.475 
(+2,+504) 22 3.75% 13:9 0.416 1.009 
Section 2. Benchmark: Market Model, CRSP Size Deciles Indices 
(-504,-2) 22 11.43% 13:9 1.606 0.881 
(-1,+1) 22 32.73% 14:8 2.102* 1.308 
(+2,+504) 22 17.26% 13:9 1.966* 0.929 
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Panel C.2 Cash Mergers: Mean Buy And Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) 
Days N BHAR Positive: Negative Skewness-corrected T-stat. Generalized Sign Z 
Section 1. Benchmark: Market Model, Dow Jones Utilities Index 
(-504,-2) 22 -3.94% 8:14 -0.459 -1.232 
(-1,+1) 22 2.37% 11:11 0.426 0.048 
(+2,+504) 22 -95.19% 12:10 -1.391 0.582 
Section 2. Benchmark: Market Model, CRSP Size Deciles Indices 
(-504,-2) 22 8.25% 12:10 0.933 0.455 
(-1,+1) 22 6.18% 14:8 1.115 1.308 
(+2,+504) 22 -0.24% 12:10 -0.013 0.503 
 
 
 
 For the two years following the acquisition, the full sample shows significantly negative CAAR relative to its 
industry peers proxied by the Dow Jones Utility Index (-9% significant at the 1% level), while relative to firms in the 
same CRSP size deciles, CAAR is negative but statistically insignificant. Full sample BHAR is negative and 
statistically significant relative to both Dow Jones (-93.47%, significant at 1%) and CRSP size deciles (-57.13%, 
significant at 1%). These results are primarily due to stock mergers, which show similar results, at the same level of 
significance. In contrast cash mergers show positive post-acquisition CAARs with the value relative to CRSP size 
deciles being significant (17.26% significant at 5%), while BHARs, while negative, are not statistically significant. 
Although our sample of cash mergers is smaller, overall stock mergers seem to show a greater tendency towards 
post-acquisition underperformance. 
 
 The pre-acquisition values based on market parameters computed over the year prior to the announcement 
are shown for completeness. Overall these results are either insignificant or only marginally so, for both cash and 
stock mergers, implying that these firms did not show unusual pre-event performance. We also calculate abnormal 
performance during the two-year pre-acquisition period based on market model parameters estimated three years 
before the acquisition. Results (not reported) were similar for cash and stock, and the significance seen for full sample 
BHAR also disappears in this case, confirming lack of unusual pre-event performance. 
 
 Table 3 indicates that cash mergers have a marginally significant increase in their systematic risk during the 
two year period following acquisitions. There are no other post-acquisition changes in Fama-French risk factors or 
equity risk for cash mergers.  Similarly, utility firms involved in stock mergers did not have any changes in their 
systematic risk or equity risk during the two year pre-acquisition period.  
 
 
Table 3:  Post-Acquisition Changes In Systematic Risk And Equity Risk 
 
 The Fama-French regression (1993) is estimated for each firm, for days (m-n, m+n), where m is the 
acquisition announcement date for the pre-acquisition period, and acquisition completion date  for the post-acquisition 
period, and n equals 504, which is the number of trading days in 2 years:  
 
                  ittitiftmtiiftit eHMLSMBRRRR    
 
 Rit and Rft are the daily returns for each firm and one-month Treasury bill, respectively, Rmt is the value-
weighted (VW) market return, SMBt is the difference between the VW returns on small firms and big firms, and 
HMLt is the difference between the VW returns on high book-to-market firms and low book-to-market firms.  The 
period between acquisition announcement and completion dates is excluded following Boehme and Sorescu (2002).  
Cross-sectional averages of pre- to post-acquisition changes in the Fama-French factors are reflected in the risk 
coefficients of βiΔ, γiΔ and δiΔ.  The post-acquisition change in equity risk is estimated using mean daily Fama-French 
factors over the sample period (Boehme and Sorescu 2002).   
 
ΔK=(βiΔ*mean[Rmt-Rft])+(γiΔ*mean[SMBt])+(δiΔ*mean[HMLt]). 
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N is the number of events with available data. P-values associated with t-tests are presented.   
 
 
Full Sample 
(N=73) 
Stock Mergers 
(N=48) 
Cash Mergers 
(N=22) 
Pre-event values 
αi 
p-value 
0.0003 
0.0575 
0.0002 
0.1241 
0.0003 
0.9218 
βi 
p-value 
0.7223 
0.0000 
0.7360 
0.0000 
0.7136 
0.0000 
γi 
p-value 
0.1153 
0.0195 
0.1479 
0.0103 
0.1482 
0.0932 
δi 
p-value 
0.7339 
0.0000 
0.7148 
0.0000 
0.8609 
0.0000 
Post-event change 
αiΔ 
p-value 
-0.0004 
0.0752 
-0.0002 
0.1519 
-0.0004 
0.5046 
βiΔ 
p-value 
0.0766 
0.0988 
-0.0131 
0.6874 
0.1941 
0.0713 
γiΔ 
p-value 
0.0053 
0.9053 
-0.0206 
0.5166 
0.0264 
0.8311 
δiΔ 
p-value 
0.1753 
0.0090 
0.0502 
0.1726 
0.2305 
0.2229 
Fama French Factors 
[Rmt-Rft] 
p-value 
0.0001 
0.6345 
0.0001 
0.6345 
-0.0003 
0.4987 
[SMBt] 
p-value 
-0.0000 
0.9432 
-0.0000 
0.9432 
0.0003 
0.2207 
[HMLt] 
p-value 
0.0002 
0.2670 
0.0002 
0.2670 
0.0003 
0.2494 
Equity risk change 
ΔK 
p-value 
0.0000 
0.1285 
0.0000 
0.2773 
0.0000 
0.7100 
 
 
 
Table 4 presents the pre- to post-acquisition median changes in operating margin, return on capital, book-to-
market and debt-to-equity ratios.   
 
 
Table 4: Pre- To Post-Acquisition Changes In Industry Adjusted Variables:  
Operating Margin, Return On Capital, Book-To-Market And Debt-To-Equity 
 
Operating margin is defined as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization divided by net 
sales revenue.  Return on Capital is net income divided by sum of total equity and debt.  Book-to-Market is the ratio of 
book value of equity to market value of equity, which is the product of stock price per share and number of stocks 
outstanding.  Debt-to-Equity is the ratio of book value of total debt to book value of total equity.  Results are presented 
for full sample of utility mergers as well as stock and cash mergers.  
   
Pre shows the median value during the 8 quarters prior to the acquisition announcement. Post shows the 
median value during the 8 quarters after the acquisition completion. Change in value for each firm from pre- to post-
acquisition is estimated as industry adjusted mean during the two-year post-acquisition period in excess of that during 
the two year pre-acquisition period. We assign each sample firm to a business sector that includes all companies in the 
S&P Super Composite 1500 Index with the same SIC code as the sample firm. Industry adjusted values for each sample 
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firm are the firm values in excess of its business sector averages. The S&P Super Composite 1500 Index is a broad 
market index representing 90% of the U.S. equities and includes S&P 500, S&P Mid Cap 400 and the S&P Small Cap 
600 indices. All operating variables are adjusted for industry and estimated using quarterly Compustat data.  Median 
values are presented. P-values in brackets are associated with Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests for Pre and Post values and 
Wilcoxon rank sum test for Change.  The number of events with available data for the full sample, stock mergers and 
cash mergers are 48, 34 and 17, respectively. 
 
 
 Full  Sample Stock Mergers Cash Mergers 
 Pre Post Change Pre Post Change Pre Post Change 
Operating Margin (%) 
Sample 
Industry 
 
Industry adjusted 
 [p-value] 
 
27.60 
28.52 
 
1.21 
[0.585] 
 
20.90 
24.34 
 
-1.67 
[0.199] 
 
 
 
 
-0.34 
[0.216] 
 
28.60 
30.19 
 
1.10 
[0.914] 
 
22.00 
24.40 
 
-1.92 
[0.184] 
 
 
 
 
-1.71 
[0.318] 
 
22.16 
22.39 
 
1.21 
[0.579] 
 
19.26 
22.75 
 
-0.80 
[0.562] 
 
 
 
 
2.13 
[0.476] 
Return on Capital (%) 
Sample 
Industry 
 
Industry adjusted 
[p-value] 
 
5.80 
5.08 
 
0.78 
[0.037] 
 
4.71 
4.49 
 
0.39 
[0.242] 
 
 
 
 
-0.50 
[0.726] 
 
5.89 
5.11 
 
0.73 
[0.201] 
 
4.74 
4.82 
 
0.40 
[0.476] 
 
 
 
 
-0.335 
[0.855] 
 
5.38 
4.95 
 
0.79 
[0.145] 
 
4.35 
4.28 
 
0.66 
[0.747] 
 
 
 
 
-0.089 
[0.528] 
Book-to-Market  
Sample 
Industry 
 
Industry adjusted 
[p-value] 
 
0.56 
0.63 
 
-0.06 
[0.022] 
 
0.52 
0.61 
 
-0.06 
[0.031] 
 
 
 
 
-0.003 
[0.785] 
 
0.58 
0.62 
 
-0.04 
[0.195] 
 
0.54 
0.62 
 
-0.06 
[0.060] 
 
 
 
 
0.000 
[0.461] 
 
0.53 
0.63 
 
-0.08 
[0.120] 
 
0.54 
0.60 
 
-0.06 
[0.934] 
 
 
 
 
-0.01 
[0.552] 
Debt-to-Equity (%) 
Sample 
Industry 
 
Industry adjusted 
[p-value] 
 
108.90 
140.47 
 
-24.26 
[0.001] 
 
142.27 
163.03 
 
-13.92 
[0.035] 
 
 
 
 
10.71 
[0.265] 
 
103.02 
119.78 
 
-18.07 
[0.006] 
 
142.39 
153.86 
 
-7.15 
[0.201] 
 
 
 
 
14.833 
[0.243] 
 
113.29 
155.96 
 
-44.00 
[0.080] 
 
143.94 
185.16 
 
-18.75 
[0.145] 
 
 
 
 
29.48 
[0.597] 
 
 
 
Analyses of operating margin and return on capital show that utility acquirers experienced no significant pre- 
to post-acquisition changes in industry adjusted operating performance in either stock mergers or cash mergers.  For 
both stock mergers and cash mergers, the book-to-market value of equity for acquirer firms is less than one and below 
the industry average, which is around 0.62.  Cash acquirers have a book-to-market value of 0.53 and 0.54 during the 
two year pre-acquisition and post-acquisition periods, respectively.  On the other hand, stock acquirers' pre-acquisition 
period book-to-market value, 0.58, decrease to 0.54 during the post-acquisition period, which is significantly lower 
than its industry level during the same period.  Stock mergers' debt-to-equity is significantly lower by 18.07 percent 
than its industry during the pre-merger period. During the post-merger period this difference decreases and becomes 
statistically not significant. For the sample of cash mergers, even though the acquirer firms have debt-to-equity levels 
below their industry, the difference is not statistically significant.  
 
 Table 5 illustrates the pre- and post-acquisition levels of CEO annual cash compensation and total 
compensation as well as post-acquisition percentage change in compensation for full sample, stock mergers and cash 
mergers.  Industry and industry adjusted sample means and medians are also reported.   
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Table 5: Post-Acquisition Change In CEO (Chief Executive Officer) Compensation  
 
Cash compensation is total salary and bonus payments while total compensation is comprised of salary, 
bonus, other annual, total value of restricted stocks granted, total value of stock options granted (estimated using 
Black Scholes), long-term incentive payouts and all other total payments made in a year. Pre (post)-acquisition 
compensation is the average of two years before (after) merger announcement (completion). Data is from Compustat 
ExecuComp which includes compensation data for approximately 2,600 largest publicly traded firms. Industry is the 
ExecuComp universe of utility firms with SIC codes 4900-49. Industry adjusted sample is sample firm compensation 
divided by the industry median compensation in the corresponding period. Pre to Post Change refers to the change in 
values from pre- to post-acquisition period.  Panels A, B and C present the results for full sample, stock mergers and 
cash mergers, respectively. $,*,**, & *** are significance at 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1%, respectively. N is the number of 
observations. 
 
 For stock mergers, the post-acquisition mean cash based CEO compensation increases by approximately 
60.41% compared to pre-acquisition period.  Industry adjusted cash compensation for stock mergers also shows an 
increase of 24.52% post-acquisition.  Total compensation for stock mergers including stock-based components shows 
a much higher post-acquisition increase for both raw sample and industry adjusted values, 175.55% and 81.12%, 
respectively.  Post-acquisition changes in both cash and total compensation are statistically significant at 0.1% for 
stock mergers.  All median values are below mean values, but similar in comparison to those of means.  For cash 
mergers, there is an increase of 36.22 percent in the post-acquisition cash compensation with a marginal significance.  
However, relative to industry we do not see a significant post-acquisition increase in CEO cash compensation.  There 
is no significant change from pre- to post-acquisition period in total CEO compensation of either of raw sample or 
industry adjusted sample for cash mergers.  We have only 15 firms with available compensation data which does not 
allow us to draw reliable inferences about the post-acquisition CEO compensation changes for the cash mergers. 
 
 
 
Pre-Acquisition 
Mean / Median  
Post-Acquisition 
Mean / Median  
Pre to Post Change 
Mean / Median 
 
Panel A. Full Sample  (N=47) 
Cash Compensation 
Sample 
$914,015 
836,700 
$1,260,060 
1,145,256 
0.5018*** 
0.4365*** 
Industry 
699,454 
663,390 
861,215 
857,742 
0.2421*** 
0.2424*** 
Industry Adjusted Sample 
1.2986 
1.3298 
1.4594 
1.4322 
0.2074** 
0.1246** 
Total Compensation 
Sample 
1,945,684 
1,323,682 
3,283,457 
2,452,229 
1.1502*** 
0.6303*** 
Industry 
1,341,828 
1,218,527 
1,777,927 
1,713,975 
0.4230*** 
0.4066*** 
Industry Adjusted Sample 
1.4166 
1.1245 
1.8566 
1.4045 
0.5224** 
0.4581*** 
 
Panel B. Stock Mergers (N=30) 
Cash Compensation 
Sample 
762,756 
809,345 
1,172,496 
1,115,732 
0.6041*** 
0.4849*** 
Industry 
654,037 
663,390 
838,711 
843,078 
0.2905*** 
0.2930*** 
Industry Adjusted Sample 
1.1849 
1.3315 
1.4051 
1.3529 
0.2452** 
01963** 
Total Compensation 
Sample 
1,262,341 
1,103,644 
3,479,627 
2,577,237 
1.7555*** 
1.8079*** 
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Industry 
1,162,821 
1,218,527 
1,768,692 
1,782,579 
0.6175*** 
0.5263*** 
Industry Adjusted Sample 
1.1532 
1.0994 
1.9873 
1.4869 
0.8112** 
0.6078*** 
 
Panel C. Cash Mergers (N=15) 
Cash Compensation 
Sample 
1,101,910 
953,700 
1,388,316 
1,196,150 
0.3622$ 
0.2934$ 
Industry 
775,011 
748,844 
899,996 
857,742 
0.1644*** 
0.1454** 
Industry Adjusted Sample 
1.4092 
1.2736 
1.5297 
1.3945 
0.1680 
0.0950 
Total Compensation 
Sample 
2,420,685 
1,893,637 
2,517,731 
1,969,655 
0.1556 
0.0329 
Industry 
1,630,768 
1,531,962 
1,805,622 
1,713,975 
0.1156** 
0.1188** 
Industry Adjusted Sample 
1.4458 
1.1210 
1.4082 
1.1738 
0.0386 
-0.1449 
 
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
Our analyses of U.S. public utility mergers over 1996-2002 for post-acquisition changes in stock and 
operating performance, and risk metrics including systematic risk and equity risk for the firm show that similar to  the 
results of Becker-Blease et al. (2004) for utilities and in line with studies on mergers and acquisitions in unregulated 
industries (e.g. Cakici, 2004) we find no evidence that utility mergers led to any economic benefit for acquirer 
shareholders.  
 
In line with the method of payment hypothesis (see for example Franks et al. 1991; Loughran and Vijh, 1997; 
Rau and Vermaelen, 1998; Hou et al, 2000) that predicts post-acquisition underperformance for stock acquirers, stock 
mergers in our sample significantly underperformed their benchmarks during the two years following the acquisition. 
BHAR and CAAR results show similar trends. Our sample of cash mergers does not show a tendency towards 
post-acquisition underperformance. We find that companies involved in cash mergers showed a marginal increase in 
systematic risk.  We do not observe any abnormal performance in terms of the underlying operating returns. All 
samples, and the industry as a whole, have book to market ratios less than 1.  
 
Stock acquisitions were also accompanied by significant increases in CEO compensation. We have 
compensation data only for 15 cash mergers, and so the results are not statistically reliable. However, for these firms 
we did not see similar increases as for stock acquirers. 
 
For stock mergers our results suggest that the potential for increased prestige and compensation, in 
association with the lack of shareholder and even management clarity regarding the effects of a complex transaction 
such as a merger, may be the prime driver for merger activities that could cause subsequent underperformance. For 
cash mergers we do not find underperformance or significant increases in CEO compensation, but our sample size is 
smaller and there is more clustering in time, towards the latter half of the sample period. There is, however, no 
evidence that shareholders benefited from cash mergers either. 
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